President of the U.S., 1989-1993; Former Republican Rep. (TX)
1991: continuing conflict into Baghdad would be un-American
In 1991, with Saddam's forces on the run, the Bush team faced a crucial decision, one that would have lasting consequences. The war's initial goal had been achieved: Saddam's forces had been driven from Kuwait. The question then was weather the
United States should end the conflict or move to Baghdad to topple Saddam Hussein's regime.
"I remember very clearly Colin Powell saying that this thing was turning into a massacre," Robert Gates, then the deputy national security adviser later
recalled. "And that to continue it beyond a certain point would be un-American, and he even used the word unchivalrous." Bush agreed, and drew the war to a quick close. After the war ended, President Bush urged Iraqis to "take matters into
their own hands."
For this part, Saddam Hussein came to believe that the United States lacked the commitment to follow through on its rhetoric. He saw America as unwilling to take the risks necessary for an invasion of Iraq.
1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait: "This shall not stand!"
U.S.-driven military buildup dubbed "Desert Shield." Bush famously declared at the time of the invasion that "this shall not stand" and would be rolled back by force unless Iraqi strongman Saddam Hussein withdrew.
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 had triggered a strong diplomatic response at the United Nations from President George H.W.Bush that segued from stronger sanctions to a
Meanwhile, the Foreign Relations committee scheduled hearings on the crisis.
Biden called for a special session of the Senate to debate the American policy, charging that Bush had "moved from a reasoned and practical response to a misguided policy in the [Persian] Gulf.
April 1990: sent Congressional delegation to reassure Saddam
Washington's strong support for Saddam Hussein thought the period of his worst atrocities in the 1980s, when he was so admired in Washington that his most shocking crimes--the murderous slaughter of Kurds--were denied by the Reagan administration and
congressional protests were blocked. The excuse offered is that Iran was more dangerous, but apart from the cynicism, such apologetics cannot be taken seriously. Well after Iraq's war with Iran, the US continued to support Saddam, even to expedite his
development of weapons of mass destruction.
In 1990, Pres. Bush I even sent a high-level congressional delegation, led by Sen. Bob Dole, to convey his personal greetings to his good friend and to assure him that he should disregard criticisms by "the
haughty and pampered press," who are out of control.
A few months later Saddam defied or misunderstood orders, and shifted from admired friend to the embodiment of evil. All such matters have been consigned to the usual repository of unwelcome fact.
2007: Panama declared Day of Mourning about 1989 US invasion
In December 2007, Panama declared a Day of Mourning to commemorate the US invasion of 1989, which killed thousands of poor people, so Panamanian human rights groups concluded, when Bush I bombed the El Chorillo slums and other civilian targets.
The Day of Mourning of the unpeople scarcely merited a flicker of an eyelid here. It is also of no interest that Bush's invasion of Panama, another textbook example of aggression, appears to have been more deadly that Saddam's invasion of
Kuwait a few months later. Similarly unworthy of note is the fact that Washington's greatest fear was that Saddam would imitate its behavior in
Panama, installing a client government and then leaving, the main reason Washington blocked diplomacy with almost complete media cooperation.
1992 warning on Kuwait from Thatcher: "Don't go wobbly"
[Pres. Bush said], "I see history as a book with many pages and each day we fill a page with acts of hopefulness and meaning. The new breeze blows, a page turns, the story unfolds. And so today a chapter begins, a small and stately story of unity,
diversity, and generosity--shared and written, together." Leaders like George H. W. Bush show that there is no "great man" theory of management, but a preference instead for empathy, sincerity, warmth, erudition and personal style.
This contrasts with more directive or autocratic approaches, such as those displayed by British prime minister Margaret Thatcher who famously warned George H. W. Bush during the first Gulf War not to "go wobbly".
Following the relative popularity and success of the Reagan years, Bush highlighted and reinforced the need of CEOs to show empathy and to connect with people.
Humanitarian aid troops in Somalia became aggressive in 90s
Two Black Hawk helicopters had been shot down in Somalia. Details were vague, but it was clear that American soldiers had been killed and that there might be ongoing violence. Troops had originally been sent to the famine-ravaged country by President
Bush on a humanitarian aid mission, but it had evolved into a more aggressive peacekeeping effort.
Every President must quickly adopt a strategy when troubling events unfold:
He can stop everything else and focus very publicly on the crisis or handle the situation while trying to stick to his official schedule. Bill remained in California but stayed in constant touch with his national security team.
Then the news got worse: The body found of an American serviceman had been dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, an appalling act of barbarity orchestrated by the Somali warlord General Mohamed Aideed.
“This will not stand” began 13-year campaign against Saddam
The truth is, the 2003 war with Iraq began in early January 1991-with the congressional resolution authorizing President George H. W. Bush to use military force to liberate Kuwait-and the war hasn’t ended yet. In August of 1990, Iraq invaded and overran
its smaller neighbor, Kuwait. US policy at the time was to contain any further Iraqi aggression, force an Iraqi withdrawal, and liberate Kuwait. As the first President Bush announced, “This will not stand.” The American public saw in Iraqi president
Saddam Hussein a dislikable Middle East potentate who became the arch-villain in a thirteen-year morality play starring the US. The military campaign against him began on January 17, 1991. The American successes were so overwhelming that operations were
halted after only about 100 hours of ground combat. At the time it seemed we had won a magnificent victory, but many of the Iraqi forces, particularly the Republican Guards, were not destroyed. An uneasy peace followed.
Called for an uprising against Saddam, but didn’t support it
If Saddam Hussein was so bad, why stop with liberating Kuwait? Among the American leaders calling for action to remove Saddam Hussein from power was President Bush himself, who suggested that the people of Iraq overthrow him. The common expectation in
Washington was that his defeat would, one way or the other, result in Saddam’s loss of power in Iraq.
Inside Iraq, the aftermath of the war was complicated. Incited by the US and its victory over Saddam, Shiite Muslims in the south, long sympathetic
to neighboring Iran, and the Kurdish minority in the north began rebellions that threatened Saddam’s rule. The insurrections were brutally repressed by Saddam, and the US failed to intercede. In the north Saddam’s campaign against the Kurds was
blocked by the imposition of an Iraqi no-fly zone, a humanitarian relief mission, and threats of U.S. intervention should Saddam attempt to repress the Kurdish elements there. What followed was an angry cessation of hostilities.
Survived 1993 assassination attempt in Kuwait by Saddam
Step by step in 1992, the US established a postwar security presence in Kuwait itself, building up a headquarters staff and periodically redeploying troops for purposes of deterring Iraqi pressures against Kuwait. Even the new administration under Bill
Clinton couldn’t quite escape the Iraq problem. In 1993 the Iraqis plotted to assassinate the former president, George H. W. Bush, during his visit to Kuwait. The US responded by launching a cruise missile strike against Iraq’s intelligence headquarters.
It was a demonstration of US power to the region-and a reminder to Saddam of American hostility. Saddam waited a year and then, in reprise, sent his best divisions south toward Kuwait, where they reoccupied some of the same assembly areas they had
used in 1990 to stage the invasion of Kuwait. The US immediately deployed aircraft and alerted US troops for deployment. If it was only an Iraqi feint, it nevertheless generated a renewed American determination not to be caught off-guard again.
1991: “All means necessary” to expel Saddam from Kuwait
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 provided Bush’s most serious crisis and his finest hour as president. His masterful diplomacy fashioned a broad international coalition against Iraq. Justifying the U.S. response, Bush cited the unprovoked
invasion of defenseless Kuwait, Iraq’s desire to control a large portion of the world’s oil reserves, and Iraq’s growing nuclear-weapons potential. In January 1991 Bush asked Congress for “all necessary means” to expel Iraq from Kuwait. He received
congressional approval to use force, and the U.S.-led allies launched a punishing aerial assault on strategic sites in Iraq. In a ground war in February, lasting just 100 hours, allied forces drove the Iraqis from Kuwait. Bush’s popularity rose to
historic highs for a president, but he drew some criticism for ordering a cease-fire before Iraq’s president, Saddam Hussein, was ousted.
Source: Grolier’s Encyclopedia on-line: “The Presidency”
, Dec 25, 2000
Invaded Panama in 1989 to force Noriega from power
Bush relied on force to settle accounts with Panama’s strongman Gen. Manuel Noriega. In December 1989 Bush ordered troops into Panama and forced Noriega from power.
Noriega surrendered, was brought to trial in a U.S. court, and was convicted of a series of charges.
Source: Grolier Encyclopedia on-line, “The Presidency”
, Dec 25, 2000
No loans to Israel until West Bank settlements stop
It was a sensitive time in our relationship with Israel. They were asking for $10 billion in loan guarantees, mainly to help them with the huge influx of Soviet immigrants. However, their insistence on continuing the settlement of the West Bank was a key
issue in peace negotiations with the Arabs. I made a tough decision to delay the loan guarantees until they agreed to stop building settlements in the disputed territories, because the money, either directly or indirectly, would support those settlements
I wrote this letter to a Republican activist in the Jewish community.
Whatever happens, it is essential that this issue not be allowed to weaken, much less cast doubt upon, the core relationship between the US and Israel.
I have come to
believe that the measure of a good relationship is not the ability to agree, but rather the ability to disagree on specifics without placing fundamentals at risk. We do this all the time with Britain: we should manage to do it with Israel.
By Feb. 27, it was over. Saddam’s army-what was left of it-was fleeing. Cheney and Powell came over to the Oval Office and told me we had achieved our objectives. We called Schwarzkopf from the Oval Office and asked him if he agreed it was time to end
the fighting. After checking with his commanders, he said yes. 100 hours after the ground war had begun, I announced to the nation that the war was over.
I was convinced, as were all our Arab friends and allies, that Hussein would be overthrown once
the war ended. That did not and has still not happened. We underestimated his brutality and cruelty to his own people and the stranglehold he has on his country. We were disappointed, but I still do not regret my decision to end the war when we did.
I do not believe in what I call “mission creep.” Our mission, as mandated by the UN, was clear: end the aggression. We did that. We liberated Kuwait and destroyed Hussein’s military machine so that he could no longer threaten his neighbors.
Force the Butcher of Baghdad to end the Rape of Kuwait
Before ordering our troops into battle in Kuwait, I thought long and hard about casualties, or, as our severest critics would put it-“body bags.” But as I pondered that horrible question, I also thought of unchecked aggression, of what would happen if
the butcher of Baghdad could emerge the hero. What would that have meant for tomorrow?
My mind always went back to the questions: “What if Hitler’s aggression had been checked earlier on? How many lives would have been saved?”
You state that “recourse to war” could make Saddam a hero and a martyr. Yes, there may be such a risk, but the risk of having him prevail is far worse. He has been the bully in the neighborhood for a long time.
Saddam tried to make the Palestine question the rallying cry, tried to use it to cover up his brutal takeover of Kuwait. I remain determined that he not link the Palestine question, which urgently needs a solution, to the rape of Kuwait.
